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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of the 2011 industrial relations reform in Greece that made firms 
with less than 50 employees eligible to participate to firm-level bargaining. Matching 
administrative contractual data with longitudinal firm-level data we identify firms affected and 
not affected by the reform. We find that during the first post-reform year, affected firms with 
less than 50 employees experienced a 4.8 percent increase in the probability of firm-level 
contracting and a 12 percent drop in wage floors relative to not affected firms. We also report 
estimates regarding the post-reform employment effect of firm-level bargaining. 
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1 Introduction 
Decentralised collective bargaining is a commonly used mechanism for setting wage floors that 
reflect workplace characteristics, productivity and market idiosyncrasies (Card and de la Rica, 
2006; Le Bihan et al., 2012; Breda, 2015; Fougère et al. 2018). This mechanism has been found 
to be popular during recessionary periods because it facilitates nominal downward wage 
adjustments (Daouli et al. 2016; Addison et al. 2017; Janssen, 2017). However, apart from 
market and firm-specific attributes, the probability of a firm to engage in decentralised 
collective wage negotiations is also affected by the provisions of the existing industrial 
relations laws applied to a specific country (Dustmann et al. 2014; Lucifora and Origo, 2015). 
Hence, restructuring the industrial relations framework may alter the motives and 
characteristics of the agents participating to wage floor negotiations. Eventually this is expected 
to alter the structure of firm-level contracting, the determinants of contractual nominal wage 
floors and affect employment as well (Katz, 1993; Jimeno and Thomas, 2013; de Pinto, 2017; 
Brändle and Goerke, 2018).  
In this paper we study the decentralised bargaining system in Greece by investigating 
the 2011 industrial relations reform that allowed firms with less than 50 employees to 
participate to firm-level bargaining. The reform (Law 4024/2011, implemented in October 
2011) aimed at confronting the longstanding wage rigidities and align labour costs with firm-
specific characteristics and labour market conditions. For analytical purposes, we collected the 
universe of administrative contractual data for the period 2006-2016 and matched them to 
longitudinal firm-level data in order to identify firms that were affected and not affected by the 
reform on the basis of their number of employees. A difference-in-differences estimation 
strategy shows that during the first twelve months after the reform, firms with less than 50 
employees experienced a 4.8 percent increase in firm-level bargaining compared to firms with 
more than 50 employees. During that period (November 2011-December 2012) the number of 
firm-level agreements quadrupled compared to pre-reform years. However, that rise was short-
lived. Firm-level negotiations became less popular amongst labour unions and policy makers 
in later years as they were mostly leading to downward nominal wage adjustments (Daouli at 
al. 2016). Nevertheless, recent empirical evidence suggests that since 2012 the allocation of 
labour across firms improved drastically because more productive firms were able to attract or 
retain more workers (Bulman and Pisu, 2018). In this paper, we attempt to provide empirical 
evidence on labour market effects of the 2011 industrial relations reform using longitudinal 
firm-level data. We estimate the impact of the reform on contractual wages by using firms that 
did not sign firm-level agreements as the counterfactual scenario and also report estimates 
regarding the post-reform effect of firm-level bargaining on employment.  
 Before the 2011 reform the Greek collective bargaining framework was governed by 
the provisions of Law 1876/1990. Representation of workers within a firm was possible either 
through a trade union (TU) or an association of persons (AP) as both types were officially 
recognised by earlier legislation (Law 1264/1982). TUs can be formed by a minimum of 20 
workers and APs could be established by at least 10 workers but only in firms employing up 
to 40 workers and only in the absence of a TU covering already half the firm’s workforce. 
Moreover, APs were short-lived as they could not be active for more than 6 months and they 
were formed for very specific purposes only. Furthermore, under the previous regime, 
decentralised collective agreements over wages and other employment conditions could only 
be signed in firms with TUs and given that they employ at least 50 workers. This institutional 
feature restricted a large part of the labour force from engaging in firm-level wage negotiations, 
as firms with less than 50 employees cover at least 60 percent of the total private sector 
workforce in Greece. The 2011 reform (Law 4024/2011) removed the restrictions regarding 
the ability of APs to sign firm-level collective agreements. More specifically, it eliminated the 
size threshold according to which APs could only operate in firms with less than 40 workers. 
Therefore, it allowed the formation of APs regardless of the firm size, given that the AP 
represents at least 60 percent of the total workforce and that there is not a TU already within 
the firm. In addition, the reform allowed APs to operate on a permanent basis instead for 6 
months only. Hence, the 2011 reform made all firms eligible to participate to decentralised 
wage negotiations by removing the institutional threshold previously set to 50 workers. The 
only firm size restriction is that APs should be formed in firms with at least 5 employees in 
order to ensure that the 3 out of 5 employees are elected as workers’ representatives.    
In terms of negotiated wage outcomes, the 2011 reform redefined the limits within 
which wages floors can oscillate. Under the previous regime, employee remuneration was 
subject to different collective agreements (sectoral, occupational, firm-level) and the one with 
the most favourable provisions was applied, i.e. the “favourability principle”. Moreover, firm-
level negotiations could not determine wage floors lower than those set at broader levels of 
collective bargaining, i.e. sectoral and occupational. However, after the reform firm-level 
collective agreements prevail relative to sectoral and occupational ones, but not relative to the 
National General Collective Agreement. Therefore, negotiations between employers and 
employees can lead to wage floors deviating either above or below thresholds set at the sectoral 
or occupational levels while the National Minimum Wage provisions are statutory and apply 
to all workers. Details for the transformation of the employment regulation in Greece is 
provided by Voskeritsian and Kornelakis (2014) and the role of APs under the 2011 reform is 
presented in Daouli et al. (2013; 2016). 
For analytical purposes we develop a unique dataset containing every official wage 
floor-setting agreement signed at the firm level in Greece during the period 2006-2016. This 
extends the data developed by Daouli et al. (2016) to investigate nominal wage adjustments in 
firm-level agreements during the period 2010-2013. The importance and superiority of contract 
data over survey data for analysing downward wage rigidities has been highlighted in several 
studies (e.g. Christofides and Stengos, 2003; Druant et al., 2012; Le Bihan et al., 2012). 
However, covering a longer period is not the only extension. Firm-level contractual data have 
been matched to demographic and balance sheet information not only for firms engaged in 
decentralised negotiations but also for those not setting their wages at the firm level. This 
allows the identification of any changes in firm behaviour before and after the reform regarding 
decentralised contracting and its outcomes. Despite an increasing public interest about the 
future of decentralised collective bargaining in Greece (van Ours et al. 2016) our knowledge 
about its changing structure due to the 2011 reform remains limited.  
Our empirical strategy relies on identifying firms that were affected by the 2011 reform. 
The developed longitudinal dataset provides us with information on firm size. Firms affected 
by the reform employ 5-50 employees. Contractual wage floors for this group are compared 
with wage floors for firms employing more than 50 employees. Since we observe wage floors 
for both groups in the pre- and post-reform periods, we use differences-in-differences 
estimators to identify the differential impact of the reform on nominal contractual wages. We 
also estimate linear and non-linear probability models regarding the incidence of firm-level 
contracting using flexible model specifications and controlling for a wide set of characteristics. 
This allows us to identify whether affected and not affected firms exhibited a differentiated 
response in firm level bargaining after the 2011 reform. Contractual wage outcomes are 
modelled using OLS and models corrected for non-random sorting of firms into decentralised 
negotiations. Lastly, we report estimates regarding the differentiated impact of firm-level 
contracting on employment by estimating a treatment effects model for affected and non-
affected firms. Our results show that firm-level contracting varies with firm size, location, 
industry, market power and performance. Moreover, this heterogeneity became more apparent 
after the 2011 reform. Firms affected by the reform experienced a post-reform increase by 1.5 
percent in firm-level bargaining, compared to firms not affected. The result is stronger, 4.8 
percent, during the first twelve post-reform months. In addition, affected firms face higher 
downward nominal wage floor adjustments, about 11-15 percent, compared to not affected 
firms. In robustness checks we restrict the estimation sample to narrower windows around the 
policy cutoff to ensure the validity of our estimates. Finally, firms signed firm-level contracts 
after the 2011 reform experienced an increase in employment.  
Our paper contributes to the literature studying the determinants of firm-level 
contracting (Christofides and Stengos, 2003; Card and del la Rica, 2006; Avouyi-Dovi et al. 
2013; Daouli, 2013; 2016) by examining how collective bargaining behaviour of firms changed 
due to the reformed provisions of the industrial relations framework. Moreover, our work is 
related to the literature of the determinants of negotiated wage floors set at broader levels of 
bargaining, i.e. industry-level wage floors (Fougère et al., 2018). In addition, the present study 
is linked to the literature investigating mechanisms of downward nominal wage adjustments 
during recessions, especially in southern European countries (Addison et al., 2017). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the data. 
Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy and Section 4 presents and discusses the results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2 Data  
In order to examine variation in contractual wage floors we collected information on 
decentralised bargaining outcomes from the universe of official firm-level contracts signed in 
Greece during the period 2006-2016. The dataset has been developed by extracting information 
from several sources, i.e. the printed registry (2002-2008) and the online registry (2010-2016) 
maintained by the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare (YPAKP) and the publicly 
available agreements on the Greek Organisation for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) 
website, covering the period 2006-2016. In order to ensure that each contract is a unique entry 
in our dataset we matched all contracts using their signing date and company name. Wage floor 
provisions were only available for the period 2006-2016, hence contracts signed during 2002-
2005 were excluded. During the period 2006-2016 there were 3,364 contracts containing 
information on business name, location of the agreement, signing and effective dates and 85% 
of them include wage floor provisions. Using the tax identification number and the company 
name referred in each contract we matched them to firms included in the ICAP Data.Prisma 
dataset that covers all firms in Greece and provide information on their basic characteristics, 
balance sheet data, contact details etc. Information on the tax identification number was not 
available for 220 contracts (5.6% of the original sample).  
This exercise resulted in a rich longitudinal firm-level dataset following firms that do 
and do not participate to firm-level bargaining before and after the 2011 reform. Moreover, we 
have information on their number of employees, legal status, sector of economic activity 
(NACE Rev.2, 4-digit) and location (NUTS-3). Firms are classified into affected and non-
affected ones, based on their average number of employees during the pre-reform period (2006-
2011). For contracts without information on the tax identification number we uncovered their 
number of employees by contacting them directly using details included in the official contract 
(along with information on legal status, sector and location). Thus, our dataset consists of 
monthly observations (January 2006-December 2016) of firms with non-missing information 
on firm-size, legal status, sector of economic activity and location. For firms that signed firm-
level contracts we also collected information regarding their employees’ representation type, 
i.e. TUs, APs or local trade unions.  
Figure 1 compares the evolution of firm-level contacting for firms affected and not 
affected by the reform. Firm-level bargaining increased for a few months after the reform for 
firms with 5-50 employees. We also observe a spike 16 months before the reform for affected 
firms, but this refers to contracts signed by local trade unions and mainly corresponds to a 
specific industry, i.e. shipyards located at Piraeus port. The timing of firm-level contracting 
has also changed. Before the reform most contracts were signed one month after the National 
General Collective Agreement but during the post-reform period they tend to be signed earlier 
in the year (Figure 2).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
For firms that signed firm-level contracts we observe their contractual nominal wage 
floors as those are reported in the document of each agreement and use them as our main wage 
adjustment measure. We also observe wage floor changes in those contracts and use them as 
an additional indicator. Figure 3 (4) compares wage floor levels (changes) for affected and not 
affected firms 12 months before and after the reform. Wage floor reductions for the former 
were greater as compared to the latter shortly after the reform (6 months) with that difference 
remaining stable afterwards. Furthermore, pre-reform bargained wage outcomes seem to 
follow parallel trends over time.     
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Regarding the sources of firm-specific heterogeneity, we should notice that the 
available balance sheet information is limited. Missing information on many firms restricts us 
from constructing firm-specific performance indicators. For instance, it is well established that 
including controls for market concentration and rent payments may explain a large part of 
contractual wage variation (Guertzgen, 2009; Breda 2015). In order to overcome such 
limitations, we estimated three indicators by sector and year to be used in robustness checks. 
The first one relates to worker productivity. It is constructed by regressing (ln) hourly wage 
rates of the 2-digit NACE Rev.2 sector (Labour Force Survey, CPI: 2015=100) on age, years 
of education, gender and regional fixed effects. The second one captures profitability 
differences between sectors, and it refers to the estimated average profitability by year and 
sector (NACE Rev.2, 4-digit, ICAP, CPI: 2015=100). It is constructed by regressing the ratio 
of operating income net of depreciation over total assets on total assets, firm’s age, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and year dummies (Grullon et al., 2017). The third index is the 
estimated price cost margin by year and sector (NACE Rev.2, 4-digit, ICAP, CPI: 2015=100) 
in order to account for industry concentration levels. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) and we 
define price cost margin as the operating income before depreciation minus depreciation scaled 
by total sales. We also use a variable indicating whether a sectoral agreement (at NACE Rev.2, 
4-digit) is signed in each month in order to control for synchronization effects in the collective 
bargaining process. Lastly, in order to control for prevailing local labour market conditions, we 
include the monthly regional unemployment rate and its annual growth (provided by 
EL.STAT.).     
For the basic variables used in our empirical analysis, Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics calculated by period and group of firms. The incidence of firm-level contracting has 
increased significantly in the post-reform period for both treated and non-treated firms, 
although the increase is larger for the former. Bargained wage outcomes have deteriorated for 
all firms, however, reductions for affected firms are more pronounced after the reform. Firm 
size, ownership status (private firm or not), industry affiliation and geographical location, seem 
to be sufficiently balanced between periods and groups of firms. Some of the reported variables 
vary at more aggregate levels, e.g. sector or region, so flexible model specifications with fixed 
effects will be used to capture this type of heterogeneity before and after the implementation 
of the reform. 
[Table 1 about here] 
3 Empirical Strategy 
We apply a difference-in-differences empirical design in order to examine any differential 
effects on the probability of firm-level contracting as well as on labour market outcomes caused 
by the 2011 industrial relations reform. Law 4024/2011 made firms employing less than 50 
workers eligible to engage in decentralised collective negotiations, as long as their employees 
are represented by either a trade union (TU) or an association of persons (AP) during the 
negotiation process. Therefore, we compare bargaining outcomes for firms employing less than 
50 employees, i.e. those now allowed to participate to decentralised negotiations, to firms 
employing more than 50 employees, i.e. those not affected by the elimination of the size 
threshold. Our main identifying assumption is that in the absence of the 2011 reform nominal 
base wages would have evolved in a similar way for firms belonging to both groups (as shown 
in Figures 3 and 4). 
In this paper, the probability of a firm-level collective agreement and bargained nominal 
base wage outcomes are modelled as follows: 
yijmt = αjt + βtm + θ[Postt × 1(Treatedi)] + uijmt      (1) 
where yijmt denotes the incidence of a decentralised agreement in firm i, classified in industry j 
at calendar month m of year t, or its bargained nominal base wage outcome. Our models control 
for industry, time, region and firm-specific fixed effects as well for indicators capturing the 
prevailing economic conditions. Postt is an indicator variable equal to one during the period 
after the implementation of the reform (November 2011) and 1(Treatedi) is switched on for 
firms employing less than 50 workers, hence not eligible for decentralised bargaining before 
the reform. Therefore, θ is the parameter of interest representing the differential impact of the 
reform on firm-level contracting and bargained nominal base wage outcomes. 
Results on the incidence of firm-level contracting will be reported using both linear 
probability estimates and probit marginal effects. Results on bargained nominal base wage 
outcomes will be reported using both unadjusted OLS estimates and estimates adjusted for non-
random selection of firms in decentralised negotiations. For the latter, we follow Le Bihan et 
al. (2012) and Fougère et al. (2018) and estimate probit models for engaging in firm-level 
bargaining, as in equation (1), augmented with dummy indicators regarding the workers’ 
representation type within the firm, i.e. trade union or local trade union. According to these 
studies, variables related to either negotiation costs or legal constraints can be used as exclusion 
restrictions since they are assumed to affect only the timing of the bargaining process but 
neither the size nor the direction of wage floor adjustments. 
4 Results 
4.1 Impact on firm-level contracting 
Table 2 displays difference-in-differences estimates regarding the impact of the reform on the 
probability of firm-level contracting. Linear probability estimates are reported in columns 1 to 
3. The results suggest that in firms with 5-50 employees the probability of firm-level 
contracting increased by 0.10 percentage point per month (or 1.2 percentage points per year) 
relative to firms employing more than 50 workers, hence not affected by the reform. All 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Replacing year with month-of-
agreement fixed effects (column 2) does not change the results in a meaningful manner. In 
column 3, we interact firm size with industry fixed effects and additionally include industry-
year interactions. The results still suggest a 0.10 percentage point increase in firm-level 
contracting for affected firms. 
We contrast linear probability model estimates to probit marginal effects (Puhani, 2012) 
in columns 4-6. The estimated marginal effects are similar to the OLS coefficients.  They 
suggest that the reform led to a 0.15 percentage point increase per month (or 1.8 percentage 
points annually) in the firm-level contracting probability for firms affected by the reform (5-
50 employees) relative to firms with larger firm-size. The estimates are similar when we use 
industry-year interactions and month-of-agreement fixed effects (column 6) instead of year 
fixed effects (column 5). 
[Table 2 about here] 
4.2 Impact on wage outcomes 
Table 3 provides difference-in-differences OLS estimates regarding the impact of the 
reform on nominal base wage outcomes (levels and changes) using alternative model 
specifications. All models are estimated on the sample of firms that signed firm-level contracts 
between January 2006 and December 2016. In the first three columns we use (ln) nominal wage 
floors as the dependent variable. Conditional on the adopted specification there was a post-
reform reduction in the range of 11-15 percent for firms employing less than 50 employees 
(columns 1-3). Without controlling for industry, size and year fixed effects the wage floor 
reduction is 15 percent, while after controlling for fixed effects and their interactions the 
estimated effect drops to 11 percent (column 3). Columns 4-6 report OLS estimates for models 
using bargained nominal wage floor changes as an outcome. The results point to the same 
conclusions, i.e. a reduction in bargained nominal wage changes around 8-10 percent, subject 
to the model specification, for firms affected by the reform. The reported difference-in-
differences estimates do not simply pick up any pre-existing trends in bargained nominal base 
wage outcomes. As already shown in Figures 3 and 4, both wage measures followed parallel 
pre-reform patterns for all firms. After the reform, all firms experienced wage reductions 
although the mean reduction was larger for the group of firms that became eligible for 
decentralised bargaining. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The difference-in-difference estimates reported so far suggest that the 2011 reform had 
had a negative base wage impact on treated firms. However, as those results are conditional on 
the sample of firms that signed a wage contract in a specific month during the period under 
consideration, they could be biased from non-random selection of firms into decentralised 
negotiations. In order to account for such non-randomness, we adopt a Heckman correction 
approach. In the first step, we estimated a probit model corresponding to specifications 4-6 in 
Table 2 augmented with a binary variable indicating the workers’ representation type within 
the firm, i.e. a trade union or a local trade union. This variable will be used as our exclusion 
restrictions that will allow for a proper model identification, as it has been shown to affect the 
bargaining process but not the outcomes (Le Bihan et al., 2012; Fougère et al., 2018). Table 4 
displays the results. It seems that the unadjusted OLS estimates presented in Table 3 are not 
seriously biased. The difference-in-differences parameter estimates are similar and indicate that 
both bargained nominal post-reform wage floors and changes were reduced for the group of 
firms affected by the reform, relative to not affected ones. The inverse Mills ratio obtained 
from the decentralised bargaining participation equation is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level indicating negative selection into this level of bargaining. 
[Table 4 about here] 
4.3 Robustness checks 
After providing evidence that our parameters of interest are not driven by pre-policy 
trends and non-random selection, we test their robustness to the inclusion of additional 
covariates capturing firm-specific heterogeneity and prevailing market conditions. More 
specifically, we include location fixed effects (NUTS-2) and an ownership status (private or 
public) indicator. The prevailing labour market conditions are controlled for by the regional 
unemployment rate level and growth. Productivity differences across industries are captured 
by the sector-specific average hourly wage rate, profitability differences across sectors are 
approximated by a measure for the returns on assets, and industry concentration is measured 
by sector-specific price cost margins. A dummy indicator for whether a sectoral agreement has 
been signed during the same month is used in order to control for sectoral differences regarding 
the synchronisation of firm-level contracting with sectoral-level collective bargaining. Table 5 
displays the results. The first column displays difference-in-differences results regarding the 
probability of firm-level contracting also controlling for the type of worker representation 
within the firm; this is our first stage regression used to account for non-random selection into 
decentralised negotiations when modelling bargained wage outcomes. The estimated 
difference-in-differences coefficient remains unchanged as compared to the one in Table 2. 
Moreover, it seems that private sector companies, those operating in sectors high hourly wages 
and higher price cost margins and those located in regions with higher unemployment are less 
likely to sign firm-level contracts. Yet, firm-level contracting is more likely in regions where 
the unemployment grew faster. The results for bargained wage changes regardless of 
accounting for selection are also robust to the inclusion of the above firm and market-specific 
covariates.  
We also report estimates from estimating our model using a shorter time period around 
the 2011 reform (twelve months before and after). For firms that became eligible for 
decentralised negotiations it is more likely to participate to this sort of bargaining by 0.04 
percent per month (or 4.8 percent per year) relative to firms not affected. The likelihood of 
participation is higher for firms with TUs or local TUs and when the local labour market 
conditions deteriorate. In contrast, firm-level contracting is less likely for private firms, for 
firms in sectors with higher hourly wage rates and higher return on assets, and in higher 
unemployment regions. Regarding wage floor outcomes, we observe that in all specifications 
the inverse Mills ratio is negative and statistically significant. In addition, the OLS estimates 
are smaller than the selectivity corrected ones indicating that wage reductions are higher when 
selection is being accounted for. This implies that firms who decided to engage in firm-level 
bargaining were more prone to wage reductions due to several sources of heterogeneity related 
to productivity and profitability. In other words, the probability of firm-level contracting was 
higher for firms from low productivity and low profitability sectors. However, conditional on 
participation these factors were associated with higher wage floors.            
[Table 5 about here] 
To address any concerns regarding our estimated reform impact being driven by firm 
size we perform some robustness checks by restricting the sample to narrower windows around 
the policy cutoff. More specifically, we restrict our analysis to firms with 5-99 employees and 
to firms with 25-75 employees. The estimation results regarding the probability of firm-level 
contracting, wage floors and wage floor changes, i.e. the coefficient θ from equation 1, are 
presented in Table 6. Column 1 (5-99 employees) of Table 6 corresponds to column 6 of Table 
2 (likelihood of firm-level bargaining) and to columns 3 (wage floor level) and 6 (wage floor 
change) of Table 3. We observe that in all cases the estimated coefficients are very close in 
terms of magnitude and statistical significance, implying that our previous findings were not 
driven by firm size. This finding is further confirmed when we restrict our sample to firms with 
25-75 employees (Column 4 of Table 6). However, the estimated coefficients are smaller due 
to the exclusion of a large part of the firms that were affected by the reform, i.e. those 
employing 5-24 employees. Columns 2 and 5 of Table 6 report sample selection corrected 
results using nominal base wage levels and changes as dependent variables. Again, these are 
very close to those obtained using the unrestricted samples (columns 3 and 6 of Table 4). Lastly, 
in columns 3 and 6 of Table 6 we present estimates from model specifications that include the 
additional variables shown in Table 5 (columns 1, 5 and 9). The obtained estimates are very 
similar indicating that firm size is not considered to be a threat for our identification strategy.     
 [Table 6 about here] 
4.4 Employment effects 
The preceding analysis indicated a post-reform shift towards a more decentralised wage 
bargaining structure which in turn resulted in increased wage flexibility. This implies that 
aligning wages with productivity may have positive employment effects. We estimate 
difference-in-differences models in order to test whether decentralised negotiations affected 
firm-specific employment. We define two periods, one before (2006-2011) and one after the 
reform (2012-2016) and two groups of firms. The treated group consists of firms that first 
signed a firm-level agreement after November 2011 and the group of not affected firms consists 
of all other firms, i.e. those without firm-level contracts and those that signed firm-level 
contracts before the reform. Since our dependent variable is the number of employees, we 
calculate the average number of employees for each firm in each period to end up with a total 
of 21,242 firms (10,621 firms in each period). While this strategy helps us to observe the same 
firm before and after the reform, it could introduce several biases regarding firm entry and exit, 
mergers and acquisitions, employment turnover or missing cells in the employment variable, 
especially for small-sized firms. Nevertheless, knowing the bargaining type of each firm allows 
for an empirical investigation of the impact of firm-level bargaining on employment in the 
post-2011 period.  
We estimate several model specifications and the results are presented in Table 7. The 
estimate of interest is the interaction term between a dummy variable indicating firm-level 
contracting only after the reform and a post-reform period indicator. Models also control for 
industry (NACE Rev.2.), region (NUTS II), pre-reform firm-specific employment and 
bargaining type within the firm (company or local trade union). Our preferred model is the one 
reported in column 5, where employment levels are conditioned on a full set of covariates and 
fixed effects. According to the results, affected firms that first signed firm-level contracts after 
the reform exhibited an 8.5 percent increase in their employment during the post-reform period. 
This implies that increased wage flexibility induced by the 2011 reform had had positive 
employment effects. This finding is robust to more parsimonious model specifications 
(columns 1-4) and seems to corroborate with the argument that it was easier for more 
productive firms were able to attract or retain their workforce after the reform in Greece 
(Bulman and Pisu, 2018). This preliminary evidence warrants further investigation by using 
more appropriate data and adopting formal labour demand models focusing on the structure of 
labour costs and the adoption of the National Minimum Wage in the post reform period 
(Brändle and Goerke, 2018).     
[Table 7 about here] 
5 Conclusions 
Decentralised collective bargaining is commonly used as a wage setting mechanism to align 
wages and employment with prevailing economic conditions, especially during economic 
downturns. This paper is the first to examine the impact of the 2011 industrial relations reform 
in Greece on the probability of firm-level contracting and on bargained wage outcomes as well 
as to present some preliminary results on employment effects. Before the implementation of 
Law 4024/2011 firm-level negotiations between employers and their workforce were not 
allowed to firms employing less than 50 employees. After the reform firms with less than 50 
employees became eligible for firm-level bargaining given that their employees are represented 
by either a trade union or an association of persons. Moreover, after the reform, wages set at 
the firm level are allowed to deviate below thresholds set at broader levels of bargaining, i.e. 
sectoral and occupational, but not the National Minimum Wage one.  
This setting allowed us to examine the impact of the reform by applying a difference-
in-differences estimation strategy using firms with more than 50 employees as the control 
group and firms with less than 50 employees as the treatment group. We use the universe of 
firm-level collective agreements signed in Greece during the period 2006-2016 and match this 
information to firm-specific characteristics not only for firms covered by firm-level collective 
agreements but also for those not covered. Using linear probability and probit models we find 
that the probability of firm-level contracting increased about 4.8 percent the first post-reform 
year for affected firms. The impact on bargained wage outcomes was estimated using OLS and 
Heckman corrected models in order to account for non-random sorting of firms into 
decentralised negotiations. Our estimated difference-in-differences parameters suggest that 
nominal wage floors decreased by 12 percent during the first year after the reform for firms 
that became eligible for decentralised negotiations. Our results are robust to the inclusion of 
industry and time fixed effects and their interactions, as well as to additional covariates that 
control for firm-specific heterogeneity, local economic conditions, inter-sectoral differences 
and synchronisation with broader levels of collective bargaining. Moreover, we report an 8.5 
percent increase in employment for firms that signed their first firm-level contract after the 
reform.  
 Overall, our paper is a first empirical examination regarding the impact of the 2011 
reform using a uniquely developed firm-level panel dataset. In future research it will allow us 
to examine how wages and employment have responded during an institutionally eventful 
period were several reforms, e.g. the reduction of the National Minimum Wage, have been 
implemented in an attempt to deal with the ongoing economic crisis. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of the frequency of firm level contracting for firms 




Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organisation for Mediation and 
Arbitration (OMED) and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2. Timing of national collective bargaining, institutional reforms in 





Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organisation for Mediation and 
Arbitration (OMED) and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Black vertical dotted lines indicate the months when the National General Collective 
Agreement was signed. The black vertical dashed line (2010m05) indicates the implementation of 






Figure 3. Wage floors for firms affected (5-50 employees) and not affected (>50 




Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organisation for Mediation and 
Arbitration (OMED) and authors’ calculations. 





Figure 4. Wage floor changes for firms affected (5-50 employees) and not 




Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organisation for Mediation and 
Arbitration (OMED) and authors’ calculations. 







Table 1. Summary statistics and differences in firm-level bargaining outcomes before and after the 2011 reform 
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Association of persons (0/1) - .0225 
(.0004) 
- - .0537 
(.0002) 
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Observations 177,205 161,716 - 893,475 807,572 - - 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) and ICAP (2006-
2016). Authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 1 OLS estimates. Wages are CPI deflated (2015=100). 




Table 2. Differential impact of the 2011 reform on firm-level contracting 
 OLS Probit 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 














Size Size Industry × Size Size Size Industry × Size 
Year Month Industry × Year Year Month Industry × Year 
  Month   Month 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) and ICAP (2006-
2016). Authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Observations (monthly)=2,039,968. Firms=22,909. The post-reform period dummy is equal to 1 for the period November 2011-
December 2016 and 0 for January 2006-October 2011. In columns 4-6 probit marginal effects are reported (Puhani, 2012). Industry 
dummies correspond to NACE Rev. 2, 1 digit and size dummies to 3 categories of firm-size, i.e., 5-50 employees, 51-100 employees and 
more than 100 employees. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. 




Table 3. Differential impact of the 2011 reform on wage floor outcomes 
 Wage floor level Wage floor change 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 














Size Size Industry × Size Size Size Industry × Size 
Year Month Industry × Year Year Month Industry × Year 
  Month   Month 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) and ICAP (2006-
2016). Authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Observations (monthly)= 96,813. Firms=1,538. The post-reform period dummy is equal to 1 for the period November 2011-
December 2016 and 0 for January 2006-October 2011. Industry dummies correspond to NACE Rev. 2, 1 digit and size dummies to 3 
categories of firm-size, i.e., 5-50 employees, 51-100 employees and more than 100 employees. Wage floors are CPI deflated (2015=100). 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. 





Table 4. Differential impact of the 2011 reform on wage floor outcomes (corrected for sample selection) 
 Wage floor level Wage floor change 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 


























Size Size Industry × Size Size Size Industry × Size 
Year Month Industry × Year Year Month Industry × Year 
  Month   Month 
Exclusion restriction Bargaining type 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) and ICAP (2006-
2016). Authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Observations (monthly)=96,813. Firms=1,538. The post-reform period dummy is equal to 1 for the period November 2011-
December 2016 and 0 for January 2006-October 2011. Industry dummies correspond to NACE Rev. 2, 1 digit and size dummies to 3 
categories of firm-size, i.e., 5-50 employees, 51-100 employees and more than 100 employees. The Inverse Mills Ratio corresponds to 
specifications (4-6) reported in Table 2. Bargaining type (included only in probit equations) corresponds to whether a company trade union 
or a local trade union operates within firm (fixed effect). Wage floors are CPI deflated (2015=100). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the firm-level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
  
 
Table 5. Differential impact of the 2011 reform on wage floor outcomes (sample selection correction with additional controls) 
 Firm-level bargaining Wage floor level Wage floor change 





















 Probit  OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
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Observations 2,039,968 415,163 2,912 1,130 2,912 1,130 2,912 1,130 2,912 1,130 
 
Fixed effects 
Industry × Size 
Industry × Year 
Month 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) and ICAP (2006-2016). Authors’ calculations.  
Notes: The post-reform period dummy is equal to 1 for the period November 2011-December 2016 and 0 for January 2006-October 2011. For the period November 2010-November 2012 the post period dummy 
indicator is equal to 1 for the period November 2011-November 2011 and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies correspond to NACE Rev. 2, 1 digit and size dummies to 3 categories of firm-size, i.e., 5-50 employees, 51-
100 employees and more than 100 employees. The Inverse Mills Ratio is derived from the probit model specification reported in Columns 1 and 2 depending on the period of analysis. In columns 1-2 probit marginal 
effects are reported (Puhani, 2012). Wage floors are CPI deflated (2015=100). All models include regional fixed effects (NUT2). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. 






Table 6. Differential impact of the 2011 reform on wage floor outcomes: robustness analysis 
 [5-99 employees] [25-75 employees] 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
































Inverse Mills’ ratio No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Fixed effects Industry × Size, Industry × Year, Month 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) and ICAP (2006-2016). 
Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Numbers refer to estimates corresponding to the interaction term [Post × 5-50 employees]. In the “Firm-level bargaining” equation, probit 
marginal effects are reported (Puhani, 2012). Additional controls refer to those reported in Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
at the firm-level. 




Table 7. Differential impact of firm-level bargaining on employment 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Treatment: firm-level bargaining (observations: 21,242, firms: 10,621) 


































Company Trade Union - - - - .121*** 
(.030) 
Local Trade Union - - - - -.018 
(.062) 
Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Post × Industry, Post × Region    No No Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) and ICAP (2006-2016). 
Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: OLS estimates reported. In parentheses, heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors clustered at the firm level. The pre-reform period is 
2006-2011 and the post-reform one is 2012-2016. Employment (ln) refers to the period-specific average employment for each firm. Sample 
consists of firms with a valid number of employees (and firm size with 5 or more employees) observed in both periods. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
